Most of the discussions on the Alpha Exchange podcast consist of guests sharing views on market risk and portfolio construction. To be sure that leads the conversations down the path of monetary policy, positioning, inflation and growth. There’s a great deal of consideration around the price of optionality and the correlation of assets.
But what about insights on the nitty gritty of getting into option trades, being a liquidity provider to the Street and then risk managing those positions? Enter, Kris Abdelmessih, who spent well more than a decade doing just that. Now the author of the Moontower Substack and the founder of Moontower.ai, Kris looks back at his time on the market making front, starting with his formative experience in the renowned Susquehanna training program and ultimately trading volatility at Parallax. We talk about how he sought micro-edge by maintaining sell-side relationships, getting into positions as cleanly as possible and then having a dispassionate process for unwinding trades for which the vol profile was no longer suitable to own.
We also gain his insights on perils of trading off-the-run ETFs like those on natural gas and crude oil, with the April 2020 meltdown in the latter, an important case study. I hope you enjoy this episode of the Alpha Exchange, my conversation with Kris Abdelmessih.
[00:00:01] Hello, this is Dean Curnutt and welcome to the Alpha Exchange.
[00:00:06] Where we explore topics in financial markets associated with managing risk,
[00:00:10] generating return, and the deployment of capital,
[00:00:13] and the alternative investment industry.
[00:00:20] Most of the discussions on the Alpha Exchange podcast consisted guests
[00:00:24] sharing views on market risk and portfolio construction.
[00:00:28] To be sure that leads the conversations down the path of monetary policy,
[00:00:32] positioning, inflation and growth.
[00:00:34] There's a great deal of consideration around the price of optionality
[00:00:37] and the correlation of assets.
[00:00:40] But what about insights on the nitty-gritty of getting into option trades
[00:00:43] being a liquidity provider to the street and then risk managing those positions?
[00:00:48] Enter Kris Abdelmessih, who spent more than a decade doing just that.
[00:00:53] Now the author of the Moontower Substack and the founder of Moontower AI,
[00:00:57] Kris looks back at his time on the market making front,
[00:01:01] starting with his formative experience in the renowned
[00:01:03] Susco-Hanna training program and ultimately,
[00:01:06] trading volatility at parallax.
[00:01:09] We talk about how we sought micro-edge by maintaining
[00:01:11] cell-side relationships, getting into positions as cleanly as possible,
[00:01:16] and then having a dispassionate process for unwinding trades
[00:01:19] for which the valve profile was no longer suitable to own.
[00:01:23] We also gain insights on the parallels of trading off the run ETFs
[00:01:27] like those on natural gas and crude oil with the April 2020 meltdown
[00:01:32] in the latter an important case study.
[00:01:34] I hope you enjoyed this episode of the Alpha Exchange,
[00:01:37] my conversation with Kris Abdelmessih.
[00:01:44] My guest today on the Alpha Exchange is Kris Abdelmessih.
[00:01:47] He is the founder of the Moontower Substack, also the founder of Moontower AI
[00:01:53] and Options Analytics platform.
[00:01:55] Kris, it's great to have you on the podcast today.
[00:01:57] Thank you very much. It's a total pleasure to be here and I'm a fan of the show.
[00:02:01] Yeah, and I am very happy to have reconnected with you.
[00:02:05] I've followed really your insightful contributions.
[00:02:08] I would say to the world of Twitter on this complicated subject matter called
[00:02:14] Options Valuations. So you do a lot on that front.
[00:02:17] So we'll have plenty of really fun stuff to talk about.
[00:02:21] Let's just learn a little bit about your background.
[00:02:23] You've got some experience on the buy side and the market making side with respect to
[00:02:29] Options. Give us a little bit of a flavor for your background.
[00:02:32] I graduated in 2000 and I started at SIG.
[00:02:35] I was hired into their assistant trainer program.
[00:02:39] So I started the business on the floor of the American Stock Exchange.
[00:02:43] The very first job I had was I was the clerk and spy share.
[00:02:47] Not the options. Back when ETS, they were fairly new at the time.
[00:02:51] There was a big crowd that made markets in spy shares on the floor.
[00:02:56] Which sounds crazy today, but that's how it was.
[00:02:58] That's where I started and I came out of college not knowing anything about trading.
[00:03:02] I mean, I learned how to use Excel on the job as a clerk in that position.
[00:03:07] And then I run through the rotation.
[00:03:10] The way at SIG, the way it works, you spend six or nine months or something.
[00:03:14] Rotating at different posts on the floor.
[00:03:17] So I spent some time in the ETFs. I spent some time in options in particular.
[00:03:22] And then you go to trading class for three months.
[00:03:26] Went through that and came out and was placed into a pit on the MX as an option market maker
[00:03:32] and equity options. And then I spent several years doing that.
[00:03:36] Then I went to the New York Stock Exchange also with SIG.
[00:03:39] I was a floor broker for a year. I spent about six months after that as a specialist
[00:03:44] and a NIC in the blue room. There was an area where they had one specialist post for ETFs.
[00:03:49] So it was a specialist in some ETFs like FES and LQD and a bunch of the Excel products.
[00:03:55] And then I was asked to go to the NIMX and help start the commodity options business there.
[00:04:03] So I went with another trader who was more senior than me and he traded natural gas options.
[00:04:07] And I started the oil options business for SIG on the NIMX 4.
[00:04:11] And then I spent about three years with SIG there. I was in the oil options pit for six months
[00:04:17] and then I spent the remainder of those three years in the product options pit.
[00:04:23] So heating oil and our bob options for HU options, which was the original gasoline contract
[00:04:29] that was the transition point. I left SIG and 08 and then I took six months off and then I came back
[00:04:36] a firm called prime back to me. I was free to start my own business for them.
[00:04:42] I went into natural gas options. I ended up expanding into lots of different commodity options
[00:04:46] there and ended up getting memberships on the NIMX, the Komex and the ICE or formerly the NIMX.
[00:04:53] And then in 2012 I went to the BICIDE, parallax which is a large equity ball shop,
[00:04:58] relative value, fund in San Francisco, asked me to start the commodity options business for them.
[00:05:05] So I moved from New York to California where I lived today and I spent nine years with parallax,
[00:05:12] basically expanding that commodity options vision. I mean, we towards the tail end of my years on
[00:05:17] the floor started to develop a prototype for a cross-sectional option relative value model.
[00:05:23] And then basically implemented that with proper resources behind me at the hedge fund,
[00:05:28] ran out for nine years and then I left parallax in 2021. And since then I started writing a
[00:05:34] couple years before that and last few years have really dove into a number of educational
[00:05:40] projects and then more recently a software building the option analytics software and really
[00:05:47] leaning into the writing very hard in the last two years. Well, just in your recounting of your
[00:05:52] career you mentioned LQD, F-E-Z which is Eurostocks and NACAS and we're going to circle back to this
[00:06:00] but it got me thinking about exploring with you just this idea of the distribution of these asset
[00:06:06] prices. They're all pretty unique. There's some real ideas, synchroces there and when I think
[00:06:11] about products like that, gas especially, I want to circle back to Suscoe Hanna because as you
[00:06:18] write a lot and your sub stack is just a wealth of information and teaching and it's very clear
[00:06:24] that you're drawing on knowledge based that you've acquired over the years but I just think a
[00:06:30] root thought process that I feel like gets back to Suscoe Hanna. It's just been such an impactful
[00:06:35] organization obviously it's a dominant player in market making and liquidity provision but also
[00:06:41] in teaching and it was really early so you mentioned a couple of the segments of the training course
[00:06:48] and I just was hoping you could expand on it a little bit. The types of things you picked up on
[00:06:53] may be not really specifically but just the way to think about options and relative value. I'd love
[00:07:00] to learn more about that. Well, talk about how it was structured so first of all their headquarters
[00:07:04] are in Balakinwood, Pennsylvania so I spent the summer of 2001 living there for three months so
[00:07:11] ten weeks really. So before you go to the training class you're clicking for a senior trader on
[00:07:17] floor at a post and then after market you would go back to the office and you would basically
[00:07:25] go into mock trading classes so there would be senior traders or any trader that was walking around
[00:07:31] might hop in and just get involved and you would be doing mock trading meaning that there would
[00:07:37] be an options board up on it like board. The calls on the left that puts on the right very familiar
[00:07:42] just an option montage maybe you might have two months and the senior traders would act as brokers
[00:07:49] and they would create scenarios. The stock is 60 bucks and they say how's the 65 call and
[00:07:56] people would make a market and then the broker would make a bid and you might have to remember where
[00:08:02] the bid was because maybe comes in bid market and then maybe another broker comes in and offers
[00:08:06] some other option and you might say oh wow okay I'm going to sell these calls and
[00:08:12] it'll buy these puts and I'm going to buy the stock and I'll basically have led a risk reversal
[00:08:17] for this price which basically looks like a cost bread and I think that I'm getting 10 cents of edge
[00:08:23] to do that trade. So you're kind of putting together this matrix in real time you could imagine
[00:08:28] it's like getting poker training but with a coach over your shoulder or every step of the way they
[00:08:34] are asking well why did you do this? Why did you not hit that bid right then? What were you waiting
[00:08:39] on? What did you think the other market makers were going to do every single aspect of the decision
[00:08:46] making is deconstructed. You go through that and they can tell and later on I would teach these
[00:08:52] classes and you can tell very quickly who it's clicking for basically who's seeing the matrix here
[00:08:59] quickly and playing the game well. Basically how well you played that game determined how fast
[00:09:05] you would go to class and then when you would go to class in Bella the first four weeks
[00:09:10] were very heavy on theory so it was all classroom in the morning and I remember their head
[00:09:17] clock would come in and over the course of two days he would derive the blacksholes assumptions
[00:09:22] and then second day he would derive blacksholes and it was four hours a day so eight hours total
[00:09:28] of blacksholes and I'm not a proper math guy so it was like wisely as though over like 15 minutes
[00:09:33] into this experience but you would get all the theory and then you would have homeworks and you
[00:09:39] would be making spreadsheets and you would be building binomial trees and you would be pricing
[00:09:43] converts and all this stuff that I've largely forgotten by this point but you would spend four weeks
[00:09:49] doing that and then you would play poker in the evening some people will play back and then
[00:09:53] but you were expected to play a hundred hours of poker over the ten weeks and then the grand winner at
[00:09:59] the end would be the person with the best sharps ratio at the end of the ten weeks. After those four
[00:10:04] weeks of theory then you would have six weeks of mock trading when I say mock trading this was
[00:10:09] on a whole other level so they had a simulated trading floor in the building on the classroom
[00:10:14] and you would have your computers the handheld computers that you would carry around on the floor
[00:10:20] exchange you would have your micro hedge options model and whatever other tools and excel or whatever
[00:10:26] that you wanted on your computer and you would make markets in the screens that were overhead
[00:10:31] were just like they were on the floor full option montage is a full simulation behind the scenes but
[00:10:37] now you were really simulating the floor you were mock trading for half the day and the other half
[00:10:42] the day a different head of a business at sig would come and talk to the class and in fact
[00:10:48] Jeffias always comes one of those times and addresses the class so the one word to really
[00:10:55] tie it all together is immensely immersive it's so immersive you are living and breathing
[00:11:01] options I say that probably everybody was dreaming in option montages by the time they had gotten
[00:11:09] through all this so that was the training and they make you sign a non-compete I remember nobody really
[00:11:15] wants to sign a three or non-compete but in hindsight I think that education was well worth it
[00:11:20] and it was the best thing to happen to me it served me well for the next 20 years as you were
[00:11:24] describing the immersive experience of his thinking boy to make that investment in people and then
[00:11:29] have them run off sounds asymmetric against you in terms of what you're putting out and the risks
[00:11:36] they made you sign the contract before you went to class there you go in the spirit of
[00:11:42] optionality that's right you talked about market making backing into things like risk
[00:11:48] reversals and having to understand combos and where stock is and so forth and that's really
[00:11:55] just a arithmetic it's not really volatile it's you got to be fast and you got to be a translator
[00:12:00] very quickly and so that's probably going to help you get into positions in a favorable way
[00:12:05] once the positions are on they obviously live in breath we know all about options in terms of
[00:12:11] how they're Greek characteristics evolved based on spot the passage of time changes in
[00:12:15] ball and so forth my question is just around reflecting on your days let's say at parallax
[00:12:21] in terms of getting into positions at the right price versus nursing them along and baby
[00:12:28] sitting them properly being thoughtful around what the market was telling you giving you chances
[00:12:33] to alter that position once it's on give us a sense of the combination of those both getting
[00:12:39] into the position the importance of that relative to once it's on the books and risk
[00:12:44] managing it successfully for getting into the positions I think the experience of being a market
[00:12:49] maker that was its main value was that you understood how screens were being framed why they
[00:12:57] be being framed in a certain way you learn to price options in a relative way let's say
[00:13:03] I'm looking at GLD ball and somebody is coming in and they're offering a one month option in GLD
[00:13:11] and I might like the ball level I may have a signal or an opinion that says I think these balls
[00:13:17] look relatively cheap versus the way I'm looking at the world but you still want to maximize
[00:13:22] on the execution at the end of the day this is a game that is pretty much a game of pennies you
[00:13:28] are trading tens of thousands a hundred thousand options a day you can imagine if you're making a
[00:13:35] penny on a hundred thousand options a day that's a hundred grand a day it's a 25 million dollar
[00:13:39] year business but you know if you make a half a penny you're cutting that in half it is a game of pennies
[00:13:45] at the end of the day so you can screw up any strategy with bad execution so the market making
[00:13:51] mentality was very very key to getting in and out of positions and it did evolve but
[00:13:57] take the example when I was at prime and then I'll contrast it the parallax when I was at prime
[00:14:02] I was much smaller I was trading a lot of my own money I had a backer but I have a bunch of my own
[00:14:08] capital in escrow you're trying to make much smaller sums of money per day than you are at the fun
[00:14:13] you are trading smaller lots and your value to the broker is that you are almost in the customer
[00:14:21] service business I'm going to be fast I will respond to your phone call quickly I will be easy
[00:14:25] to deal with I'll be very upfront I will basically try my best to make you look good while I
[00:14:33] make enough edge that you keep calling me and that this business relationship works
[00:14:38] when I'm at a fund where I'm trading much larger and I'm trading more names I have a much
[00:14:44] more bird's eye view than being just an actual gas market maker where it's all I look at all day long
[00:14:50] if you're a natural gas market maker you're a broker you're one of a hundred that I have on my
[00:14:55] I am or is it ice chatter whatever it was I have a hundred brokers blinking on my I am's all day long
[00:15:02] plus the screens there's so much coming at me and I need to be able to respond be able to parse
[00:15:09] and prioritize very very quickly so that I can find the best orders and put together a picture of
[00:15:16] I can pick up two cents at the fund I'm not going to be able to be that fast I can't compete with
[00:15:22] the person who's entirely lively would depends on being the best phone call for that broker for
[00:15:27] the 25 lot so I have to have a different proposition I would tell the brokers I understand I'm
[00:15:33] not going to be the most responsive person all the time but here's what I can do the markets five
[00:15:39] five and five ten and you've got a guide that wants to buy 500 straddles there's 200 straddles
[00:15:45] offered at five ten that 200 straddles is four little market makers that are offering 50 lots each
[00:15:51] I can show you 300 more at five 15 and you can fill your whole order at five 15 I'll do 60% of
[00:15:59] the order and that's a value to the broker because here the the broker is concerned with size not speed
[00:16:06] for him to look good he doesn't want to move the market that much that's the service I'm offering
[00:16:11] for that broker and because I'm willing to offer that service to the broker I'm willing to take down
[00:16:16] more size that's how I get the phone calls there so you have to understand all the time
[00:16:22] what your niches in a marketplace are you going to be fast and trying to get like that broker
[00:16:27] is not calling me with the 25 lot unfortunately but that's okay the 25 lot I'm going to need
[00:16:34] a whole lot of them to move the needle one at the fund so it's okay I understand my role in this
[00:16:39] ecosystem and that is the execution part is understanding your service to the marketplace
[00:16:46] the position management part that's the risk management piece so I buy this ball I think this
[00:16:52] ball is cheap like an relative value basis but maybe that assets just stops moving and what I thought
[00:17:00] was cheap ball ended up being self-fulfilling and the entire cloud of asset prices on this cross-sectional
[00:17:07] view has all moved around and in fact this ball is now high well now I'm just working out of it
[00:17:13] I'm just selling out of that because my signal says this is now expensive all the fact that I lost
[00:17:17] money it's irrelevant I don't even know where my entries were I don't care this is now expensive
[00:17:23] I'm now selling it it's irrelevant the fact that at one point I thought it was cheap some part of
[00:17:28] that is based on the history of the specific asset specifically in derivatives we have a view
[00:17:35] that the past matters we certainly should incorporate the past sort of behavior of let's just use
[00:17:42] the S&P we have some version of the boundaries of the VIX at least up until now that doesn't mean
[00:17:48] it's not going to change I always say that boy at the end of 2019 no one knew that an 81 VIX
[00:17:53] was coming three months later no one knew that 2017 was going to see the S&P realized six and a half
[00:17:59] for the year you just didn't know the environment changes over time but there is some
[00:18:05] element of the NASA having certain properties I'd love to just talk a little bit about some
[00:18:10] of these quirky ETFs anytime you get into a commodity especially something like not gas
[00:18:15] where you have the weather a big part of it you weren't trading like as options when the
[00:18:21] Russia Ukraine war started and it was all this risk around the cold winter in Europe and
[00:18:27] it just created it obviously an explosive uptail in not gas the vologist went bananas
[00:18:33] I know you traded the USO in April of 2020 pick out a couple from your perspective that
[00:18:40] were just really really good learning experiences that taught you that the history of data is important
[00:18:48] but you gotta be careful not to lean into too much because the world is new and changing every day
[00:18:54] we can go into the USO one I know you've heard that one before but there's a predecessor trade
[00:18:59] to that one that primed my mind for being able to think about the USO one sort of recognized what's
[00:19:06] going on very quickly it comes from a scar back in I think it was 2010 at the time I'm at
[00:19:13] prime I did have this background in ETFs not so much in ETF options but I had it in ETFs and
[00:19:20] prime they mostly backed futures and futures options traders you could think of them as basically
[00:19:25] regulated by the CFTC they didn't really do any SEC kind of products but I'm trading natural gas
[00:19:32] and UNG is an active product and I went to them and said I would like to trade options on UNG also
[00:19:39] I have a little model here in general I think with these commodity ETFs those are more of tourist
[00:19:47] markets like if you are a serious commodity trader you are using the futures options and so the
[00:19:54] much deeper bigger markets and they are the fair valls come from those markets the ETFs
[00:20:02] should be priced off of what is fair in those markets if you put a trade on ETF you could go
[00:20:07] hedge it in the futures options the futures options are fair the ETF has an opportunity to be
[00:20:13] misprice so I said I want to trade some natural gas I want to trade UNG options as a compliment
[00:20:18] to my natural gas book so they're credit they'd never done anything like that before and they
[00:20:22] came to the green light so I started doing this there's an opportunity I'm like okay look at the
[00:20:26] UNG this was summer 2010 and remember UNG looked like three valls cheap compared to the future
[00:20:32] options so buying some UNG wall and offsetting it in the future options and I think I'm running
[00:20:39] getting like this three-volve arb if you remember this was at a period of time where they was all
[00:20:44] this talk about is like the paper barrel thing oh all the investors the speculators are pushing
[00:20:51] up the price of real things that real people need people they're pushing up the price of energy
[00:20:56] we're pushing up the price of corn all of these things that are causing distortions at the
[00:21:01] pomper in people's lives there was a bit of a backlash to the financialization of commodities
[00:21:08] so UNG announces that they are going to stop they put a limit a cap on how many shares they
[00:21:15] are going to allow to be created in response to this backlash a very very smart trading firm that
[00:21:22] I did not work for anymore and why don't know for sure exactly who it was but one out there
[00:21:26] and created all the shares up to the cap knowing of course they're taking the very informed
[00:21:31] bet that you see if we'd go to our premium to its nav so here I am long UNG options and short
[00:21:40] net gas futures options is a big premium in the nav and what happens is UNG stops moving
[00:21:47] on long options on UNG and it stops moving the futures options continue to whip around
[00:21:53] and I'm short straddles on those so what was happening as natural gas futures would drop
[00:21:59] the premium to nav would just simply expand because UNG is scarce the shares are scarce
[00:22:05] so the price really wouldn't go down so the premium would just expand and then on the days
[00:22:11] when natural gas futures would rally again I'm short options on those UNG just doesn't move
[00:22:16] and the premium would just narrow some so what happened is the premium to nav was abhorving
[00:22:23] all the volatility of the futures so the futures are moving at 60V I bought new in GVol at 57
[00:22:30] and now UNG first of all is not moving because my real life's piano I'll just be roting on the
[00:22:35] theta and then the implied vol on UNG just collapses because everyone can see it's just not moving anymore
[00:22:41] so on long 57 vol on vol is to 35 so I lose several months of expectancy
[00:22:49] on this one trade luckily I only had put the trade on you know as like a one month trade not a
[00:22:56] great experience from my back or to their credit they let me do this kind of stuff more and more
[00:23:01] this is a great example you're just not sure how strict these relationships can be there are
[00:23:07] gotchas in here so that was one example that example was the thing that prepared me for the USO
[00:23:14] example I'll give the short version of the USO example you're really remembers the oil futures
[00:23:19] in spring of 2020 they had went negative we woke up one day and USO was trading at a large
[00:23:26] premium to its nav the naive view is that oh there's a lot of retail people buying USO because
[00:23:34] they see that oil futures went negative and they just want to buy the snap back and they're not
[00:23:38] enabled for futures so they're going to go in and try to buy the ETF but we looked at it and said
[00:23:45] I actually think that well there should be a premium to the nav because if you think about USO had
[00:23:50] fundamentally changed it was no longer an oil future but it was an oil future with a zero strike
[00:23:56] put or you could think about it as it was the zero strike call on oil and you can understand that
[00:24:03] because imagine you are long USO and you are short oil futures when oil goes up trading 10
[00:24:11] box or 15 bucks they're going to add to the same oil goes up you lose on your oil future and
[00:24:17] you make on your USO and you break even but what happens when oil drops below zero is your stop
[00:24:24] out on your USO you're long USO and it cannot go below zero and then you are just short
[00:24:29] the futures so your P&L diagram looks exactly like a put option and just the bearer of that risk
[00:24:36] because effectively an option has been given away think it was called the United States oil fund
[00:24:42] the ETF provider there's a free option there that's been provided who is short that free option
[00:24:48] they're bearing the risk because they have the futures backing the ETF that's the problem
[00:24:52] which is an important key to where we're going here by the way their futures are now trading negative
[00:24:57] so there really is a zero strike call that is out of the money so you can look at the option
[00:25:04] prices of the various strikes the zero strike option and the future's options and you can say
[00:25:09] I have an idea I'm looking at that implied ball and I can actually model
[00:25:13] that premium to nav as extrinsic option premium it was an option USO turned into an option when oil
[00:25:20] is below zero so what we did was we computed what we thought the fair premium to nav was dynamically
[00:25:28] based on the implied ball in the underlying futures we were able to form an opinion about what
[00:25:34] that premium to nav should be and of course as oil futures move away from zero like if they went
[00:25:39] back up to 50 bucks the premium to nav would go to zero it makes perfect sense it's exactly
[00:25:45] like an option it would be very deep in the money at that point there would be no extrinsic
[00:25:49] the thing that we had noticed was that we thought that USO evolved to the options on USO were a sale
[00:25:57] relative to the future's options there was really three components to that opinion the first was
[00:26:02] ahead of small leet and it was just the idea that as you said USO the fun backing it is bearing
[00:26:08] the risk there is a non zero chance that this product goes to zero that USO gets wiped out obliterated
[00:26:14] off the face of the earth which would zero out all the extrinsic time premium and there were nine
[00:26:20] months one year longer than one year options listed on this thing and they were fat because
[00:26:24] the balls were elevated all this extrinsic time premium what I want to zero if USO goes to zero
[00:26:29] I'm an observing barrier so that's one small reason why we thought there was should be some
[00:26:35] discount to these options because of that possibility the bigger reason the second reason
[00:26:40] which is a bigger reason is that USO was no longer an oil future but it's an oil future plus
[00:26:45] a put in other words it's not just a portfolio of oil futures it's a portfolio that includes a hedge
[00:26:50] a hedge portfolio is mechanically less volatile than just the portfolio without the hedge we knew
[00:26:57] that when you're near zero in the oil futures as oil rallies USO is going to go up but not one
[00:27:04] for one because what's going to happen is that premium to nav is going to decay and act as a head
[00:27:09] wind on the rally and vice versa the same thing's going to happen when oil is going farther below
[00:27:14] that portfolio that's called USO which is actually a put plus the futures is less volatile
[00:27:21] than oil futures so that's another reason why it deserves a discount the final reason again goes back
[00:27:29] to thinking about the position of the United States oil fund is in and that is they tip their hand
[00:27:34] they're worried about their business they don't want their ECF to go to zero so they rolled out
[00:27:39] the futures off cycle they just decided hey we're going to roll the futures out here and said
[00:27:44] deferred contracts deferred contracts in commodity futures are mechanically less volatile than
[00:27:51] the front month future the nerds called as the Samuel Senate effect a easier way to maybe think
[00:27:56] about that is that an oil future a year out in time has some mean reversion baked into it the demand
[00:28:03] and supply are more elastic a year out people can decide they were going to drill more or we're
[00:28:08] ration our use of oil so the price in the long term is just less volatile than the price in
[00:28:14] the near term which really when this case we just ran into storage constraints so you'll see the
[00:28:19] same in rates you'll see the beta of the front month of the future is going to be higher than the
[00:28:24] beta of the four or five month of future so yeah that was definitely
[00:28:29] vol dampening in combination with I think this idea that the longer dated ones I remember looking at
[00:28:35] is that you could sell this and this is always to me an interesting aspect of
[00:28:41] especially complicated unique ETFs that especially when they had things like commodity
[00:28:47] the user they're targeting they're on vol when it's not on an equity asset you just cancel it
[00:28:53] they just decide and then there's always a real risk I think for the long dated auction holder
[00:28:58] in that context of just losing time value the intricacies only become important in these edge
[00:29:04] cases where stuff gets weird and then these relationships really blow up I want to talk a little
[00:29:08] bit more about this just notion of vol surfaces and distributions but maybe a little bit more from
[00:29:14] a technology standpoint I think this will lead us into some of your work at moon tower one of the
[00:29:20] things I was just talking about on this podcast was the extent to which we are flooded with not just
[00:29:27] thousands of ETFs with options on them but even for ETF you've got so many strikes and so many
[00:29:34] explorations now in the S&P you have an expiration every day and you've got hundreds of strikes
[00:29:42] and it's much more than a mere man can look after you're going to need the help of a pretty fast
[00:29:49] machine to do so and I was kind of riffing on this idea of price discovery especially with your
[00:29:55] experience in trading these non-standard ETFs price discovery in something like spy no big deal
[00:30:01] you kind of know where it is because everybody knows where it is but with something that's non-standard
[00:30:07] and off the run the price discovery process is a little trickier and that's for at the money in
[00:30:12] kind of the expiration sweet spot but then you've got all these other expertise all these other strikes
[00:30:19] and the construction of the vowel surfaces is very much a mathematical undertaking with heavy
[00:30:27] help from computers and technology I just hope you could talk a little bit about that the idea
[00:30:33] that we start with at the money valve but then we get this big giant vowel surface across strike
[00:30:38] in time and the thought process behind that and I guess I'll just finish with I saw one of your
[00:30:46] pieces talked about GMA you wanted to do something in GMA I for one was just absolutely blown away
[00:30:53] by the pricing of GMA on January 27th of 2021 not because the vowel was 880 but because it was
[00:31:03] four vowels wide at 880 I know it's a triumph of machines and being able to price something with
[00:31:09] that specificity at such a high and inflated vowel level so tell us just a little bit about how
[00:31:15] a vowel surface is created starting with close to the money options and sort of the way in which
[00:31:21] someone like yourself thinks about the surface and the distribution if you trade things that are opaque
[00:31:27] this is a major issue for things that are basically liquid it's sort of a non-issue I mean these
[00:31:34] market makers they're setting curves at incredibly fast speeds they have very sophisticated models
[00:31:41] it feels like a salt problem from if you're looking at the grand scheme of things where it's
[00:31:46] the most interesting is where markets are opaque and I have a lot of experience with this the big
[00:31:52] example was going into the product options pit so I was trading oil auctions and even when I
[00:31:59] started in oil auctions it was a bit of a problem because when I got in there we were just transitioning
[00:32:06] into a world that actually had screens what you had was you had some very primitive software
[00:32:12] that had a bunch of strikes and you could basically set a spline and you would have some fixed grid
[00:32:17] points you could set them say oh one standard deviation up two standard deviations up and
[00:32:22] let's say the at the money is $100 I know what the straddle is straddle is very liquid so
[00:32:27] I can use the straddle to get the at the money ball and then let's say the 110 calls the 25 delta call
[00:32:33] okay the 25 delta call just traded for this price and straddles five bucks and let's say that
[00:32:42] the 25 delta call if you set it to a dollar you end up with like an a pretty smooth ball curve
[00:32:48] between at the money in 25 delta but right now all of a sudden that call trades a dollar can
[00:32:54] and now you have a problem because the question is is did the call skew blowout or is the straddle
[00:33:02] and if you don't have any screens and you go to quote the straddle you don't know if the straddles
[00:33:08] actually higher because the market will be made higher because everybody else saw that the call
[00:33:13] straight 110 so they suspect are coming in here to buy straddles so that you could like this call
[00:33:19] spread for a cheap price 110 calls for it but their bid may not be real what happens is in
[00:33:26] opaque markets you always have this problem that the vault changer that the skew change because
[00:33:31] the things are not trading simultaneously and there's no screen for you to look at and compare or
[00:33:38] the screens are wide they're wide enough that there's enough variation in his relationship
[00:33:42] if you could be wrong on a $5 wide possible you could be off by a dime on what that thing is really
[00:33:48] worth so what happens is you really have to be heavily involved in that market watching every
[00:33:56] paying attention to where the stock was when that thing printed and seeing where adjacent prints
[00:34:01] are and then you're pouring a picture by analogy is you are catching fireflies it's a summer
[00:34:08] night in New Jersey your 12 years old and you're out there and the firefly flashes and then
[00:34:13] you're like where do I think it is now because I want to catch it and I'm not sure if it went to
[00:34:17] the left to the right or went down and to try and emulate where the fireflies are I need to see
[00:34:22] like a couple prints in a row to see what direction it's going in this problem was very acute when
[00:34:28] I went to the product options because there nobody wants to give up any information the quotes
[00:34:33] it's all fog the quote could be um five dollars at five ten fair values for 80 and the
[00:34:40] markets five five ten because people think that the order is a buyer there's no way to really figure
[00:34:47] these things out until you just get super immersed in that market and over time you figure
[00:34:52] out the patterns you figure out the patterns of flow and you start to understand why are these
[00:34:57] markets lean this way I think that people think this sounds like old tradecraft from the floor
[00:35:03] this is happening today it's happening electronically I was talking to a friend that was talking
[00:35:09] about how there's these derivative income ETFs these large ones they have these large rolls and
[00:35:14] they're predictable and he was kind of remarking how amusing it is that these rolls will go up
[00:35:22] or these trades will go up at mid-market you might look at that and be like wow look how efficient
[00:35:26] this market is it's just willing to take down I don't know if the numbers are it's willing to take
[00:35:30] down 10 million vagumid I think that table has been set 20 years ago you come in in the morning
[00:35:36] and you have an opinion about I'm going to set my curves this way because I know that this guy bought
[00:35:43] some puts three weeks ago the market has went down just puts a double-band value you see they're
[00:35:50] going to come close or he's going to roll down because he's still bearish so if he's going to
[00:35:54] come roll down he's going to come sell that foot and he's going to buy a put below so he's going
[00:35:59] to sell the puts bread so if he's going to sell the puts bread what do I want to do I want to lower
[00:36:04] my at the money straddles and I want to raise my puts you and make that put spread really cheap
[00:36:09] so he comes in he offers it mid-market I buy it mid-market I buy that put spread for four bucks when
[00:36:16] I think it's worth 420 and then over the next couple days you walk that market back up to 410
[00:36:20] 430 you are anticipating that flow ahead of time you know that that guy's not going to come
[00:36:27] in and want to hit the bit so you know he's going to be looking for a mid execution so
[00:36:32] all of this stuff I still think is happening it's pretty hard to do these things in spy
[00:36:36] like maybe if that telegraph flow is enormous you could do it but this has always been part of
[00:36:43] the options trading game and I think that that trade craft is just hit in by technology now
[00:36:49] and when you say wow how was GME 4V all's wide at 800V I would have to wonder
[00:36:56] how good is those market makers information their market width is a reflection of their confidence
[00:37:02] so if they are making the market tight maybe they think this thing is a sale they think the
[00:37:07] fall should be 800 and they're making it tight and high because they know that the flow is a buyer
[00:37:14] the flow is a fall insensitive and if they make it really wide maybe nobody would trade so they
[00:37:21] make it tight and high knowing that there's very small likelihood they're going to get hit on their
[00:37:25] bit and if they do get hit on their bit they'll just buy a little bit and move but this way they
[00:37:29] hold it up so they can smack the bids that are coming in this is just me speculating because I
[00:37:35] thought on those desks this is sort of what happened in the VIX on August 5th clearly this stuff
[00:37:41] originated outside of the United States there's a Yan Carrey trade online but it filters through
[00:37:48] we know there's a linkage between these classes of risk assets could be anything could be a yield
[00:37:54] curve trade certainly VIX has a vulnerability it got much more dislocated I think than most
[00:38:00] people thought it could and so my take is the pricing was okay we can't really sell any more of this
[00:38:07] so we're going to price it really really high such that no one really want to buy it but we don't
[00:38:13] really want to buy it either at these prices it's kind of a market that's just reflecting the
[00:38:19] prices desired but I also want you to reflect on this as we were talking about GME I was just thinking
[00:38:26] about the triumph of technology on such a high vial asset and you've got all these strikes people
[00:38:32] are trading furiously with enormous option premiums obviously because the vial realized vial is so high
[00:38:40] but it really is a triumph of technology to be able to make all these prices available and actionable
[00:38:48] had a given point in time and what I would want to really differentiate that against is what you
[00:38:55] said earlier which is let's say in your old days in a seat getting a call from a sell-side
[00:39:01] firm who's got a client who wants to do something and you realize you are there obviously to make
[00:39:07] money for your firm but there is some version of hey I want to keep this call coming in it's a good
[00:39:13] call there's a relationship here and so you may put something up its marginal because you want to
[00:39:19] keep that call coming in that's the way the sell-side voice game has been played for decades
[00:39:25] in the world of electronic liquidity it's faceless it's nameless you can be at a price and then just
[00:39:33] suddenly not be there your machine just kind of shuts down at the sides it sees something in the
[00:39:39] hall regime or the behavior of the asset underlying asset that doesn't set up and so suddenly your
[00:39:47] price change is quite a bit it's not really a person making that decision it's already been made
[00:39:52] by the parameters that are embedded within the model and that's very different that's I think
[00:39:57] quite an interesting change the advent of technology in the way in which executions are done especially
[00:40:04] think about the zero DTE space that's not someone calling someone up who makes his way to a sell-side
[00:40:11] trader Goldman Sachs and makes a price there is no voice intermediation on 95 plus percent of this stuff
[00:40:19] and I think that just creates a different dynamic I'd be curious what you think about it
[00:40:25] there's a 100% true and it's been increasingly true I mean there's no value add for you to be a phone call
[00:40:30] to trade something in the front month in a future's auction there's just plenty of screen liquidity at this point
[00:40:35] you're there because it's still crickets 12 months out your role there is to trade these longer
[00:40:41] duration things and stuff that's just generally harder to price something that I do think is kind
[00:40:46] of interesting this kind of gets into like the fragility or not of liquidity in the microstructure today
[00:40:53] I'm no expert on this but I think that there is a story out there that is very valid about
[00:41:00] liquidity is far less than what it used to be and these quotes they can just vanish
[00:41:07] I don't know to what extent that has to do with consolidation because
[00:41:12] the story of the options market of the last one years if you're just zoom out when I went to the
[00:41:17] floor I don't know how many different colored jackets there were on the floor there were a lot of
[00:41:23] firms down there lots of mom and pop little trading shops sig was a big player team for hills a big
[00:41:29] player yet spear leads and there was plenty of larger players but there was so many wildcats
[00:41:35] now the market making world is vastly consolidated you would know far better than me today just
[00:41:41] exactly how many firms make up 80% of the market share or something like that but it's a
[00:41:46] much much smaller number than it used to be and the story of options over the last 20 years has
[00:41:51] been returns to scale I say the market making the prop firms Jane Street sit at these companies are
[00:41:58] converging on tech companies as a matter of fact they're hiring the same people so they all want
[00:42:03] to hire the same people that Google wants to hire they don't want to hire me they want to
[00:42:06] hire math Olympiad kids the returns to scale have been enormous I don't know if this is
[00:42:15] by consolidating if you've made it more fragile I'm like all these firms they're running pretty
[00:42:20] similar models I mean Jane Street came out of sig sit at all securities their options desk
[00:42:26] there's a lot of sig influence in at least the most recent iteration of it there is a lot
[00:42:32] of similar thinking that is behind all the firms that run these trades I mean parallaxes a sig
[00:42:37] lady is as well when somebody's asking me for a quote in some bond option ETF it's a customer on
[00:42:44] one side trying to buy 50,000 puts it's like me Jane and Nanger cast the characters on the other side
[00:42:51] we're not trading with each other because we think the same that consolidation probably has made
[00:42:58] the market more fragile the other argument to that would be with payment for order flow and
[00:43:05] the competition to be in the exchanges good graces at the end of the day the exchanges are
[00:43:11] the point of power and centralization to be in the exchanges good graces you probably do have to
[00:43:18] be a good citizen market maker and stand there and take some trades that keep an orderly market
[00:43:25] they have much more visibility into the executions in your behavior and so they can kind of hold
[00:43:30] your feet to the fire on that and I'm not sure what the competing effects are my guess is that it's
[00:43:35] more fragile but there's no way for me to really know going back to the August 5th thing I went
[00:43:40] into the community chat on moon tower and the first thing I've chatted that morning was I looked up
[00:43:46] in the USO and I saw that D's USO of all was 3238 which is obnoxiously wide for USO and
[00:43:58] he wj was 20 balls wide it was 2040 on the ball I had never seen anything like that in my life
[00:44:04] for wj to be 20 balls wide is unheard of and I know I listened to your episode with veneer
[00:44:09] on solie and he talked about this too about it never seen the liquidity vacuum that happened in the
[00:44:15] end in his career and he's been around a lot longer than I have. I think that there's a lot of
[00:44:20] credence to the market becoming more fragile because there's less players but let's finish off with
[00:44:28] a couple of your current pursuits so talk to us a little bit about moon tower the sub stack
[00:44:35] and what you're up to there I've certainly spent some time reading through it and you've got a lot
[00:44:41] on your mind and obviously it's very option centric but you tend to relate some of your
[00:44:47] options expertise or your philosophy to life matters as well so I think you have some fun with it
[00:44:53] and obviously have a very strong subscriber base and then just tell us a little bit about moon tower
[00:44:57] AI as well. For the sub stack I started at five years ago but today I publish
[00:45:02] times a week I publish the OG letters on Sunday and then I publish on Wednesday and then I
[00:45:09] tend to publish a much more options centric the third day one is paywall I mean that's the one where
[00:45:16] I'm really diving into stuff more and oftentimes looking at data and showing stuff but
[00:45:22] the letter it started is curation here's things that I read that I thought was interesting and then
[00:45:27] maybe my like take or blurb and that's kind of how it started it was just an experiment
[00:45:31] as I would comment on things especially things that were financial I would
[00:45:36] analogize to options trading and that seemed to resonate it was weird I kind of realized at that point
[00:45:43] I might know some stuff that is not common knowledge and I started writing about that and that's
[00:45:48] really how I got the following I do write a lot of stuff that's not options related I write a lot
[00:45:53] about family matters and raising kids and playing games and teaching kids and some culture stuff
[00:46:00] in a lot of readers give me the feedback of I came for the finance and stayed for the life
[00:46:04] that's been a very consensus thing the letters very personal as well as being technical sometimes
[00:46:11] when I left parallax I did not even look at markets and any consistent basis for probably at
[00:46:18] least a year and a half but then I started getting a hankering to be able to see the world through
[00:46:23] the lens that I had become accustomed to the way I looked at things for 15 years through
[00:46:28] some of it's certain deputy I met a guy named Enigal who he's the founder of his company called
[00:46:33] Ezra and he's a software developer by background by was coaching him on options stuff
[00:46:38] he was trading crypto options for his PA and as I was coaching him I realized that
[00:46:45] the way I was teaching him was this progression that was the very progression
[00:46:50] of how I thought through trade ideas because he was a software developer it was already buying
[00:46:56] all this data and everything I would teach him something in two days later you would turn around
[00:47:00] like a prototype in the UI to be like okay here's this idea here's how it looks this is
[00:47:05] populated with data and I'd just be blown away like he just turned us around so quick
[00:47:09] it's not even as job we started doing this and then I was like let's build this out because
[00:47:14] I want to be able to have dashboards like I used to have one day he went and bought the
[00:47:19] Nuntower AI URL and said we should make this available to subscribers since we're doing it for ourselves
[00:47:26] I want this thing anyway so we can't really fail we want it for ourselves we finally launched it
[00:47:31] in March and the way I would describe this analytics platform is if we back up we understand that
[00:47:40] most of the world does not think about options as their own source of opportunity they have
[00:47:47] opinions about assets stocks and bonds and currencies and what have you well I could say is they wake
[00:47:53] up with an opinion or an ax on whatever stock in other words they think the securities are mispriced
[00:47:59] and they just assume the options are fair and they go to the options market and they sometimes
[00:48:03] they express their bets through options. Voltrators are the exact opposite. Voltrators
[00:48:09] luckily us brain damaged people we make up a very very small percent of the overall investing
[00:48:16] landscape and we look at options as a source of mispricing and then we assume the underlying
[00:48:23] is fair so our position is exactly the opposite of the typical investor's position.
[00:48:30] What the software does it's a step-by-step progression for how we think about options where we're
[00:48:36] really trying to do is say you had this idea that you wanted to trade options to express your bet let's
[00:48:40] give you the Voltrator lens and I've always had that mantra take with the VALS surface gives you
[00:48:45] and you don't even have to think that something is theoretically rich or cheap and we can argue
[00:48:52] all the long if that's really something you can calculate I think experts can professionally disagree
[00:48:58] on whether something is rich or cheap but the surface does move around and there are times when it
[00:49:06] really does facilitate something that you'd like to do. I always go back to certain energy names
[00:49:12] for example when crude has had a big rally let's say it's post rush a Ukraine and you get a big
[00:49:19] ramp in crude in March of 2022 and obviously the call skew gets really high so that translates
[00:49:27] into the equities and you can do things like one by two call spreads and get paid to handsome
[00:49:32] amount for selling off that upper strike risk. So sometimes the surface does come your way it's
[00:49:40] well Chris this has been a fantastic conversation give us a lot to think about it's also really good just
[00:49:46] to say that you found a professional passion and being able to take that and combine it with your
[00:49:52] own voice on life and getting a lot of subscribers and folks that are interested in hearing
[00:49:58] which I have to say so congrats on that and that's the luck on the very specific business pursuit on
[00:50:04] Moon Tower AI as well. I appreciate it Dean I appreciate you having me on as well like
[00:50:08] said I'm a fan and I'm a fan of your firm you get bombarded when you're on the biceye of
[00:50:13] different research pieces but the ones that your team sense were always a must read for me because
[00:50:19] they tended to be very actionable insightful and brief they were just super punchy and great and
[00:50:26] when you're getting swamped with stuff I think you guys cut right to the heart of things often
[00:50:31] you guys are doing great work and I appreciate it. You've been listening to the Alpha Exchange
[00:50:36] if you've enjoyed the show please do tell a friend and before we leave I wanted to invite you
[00:50:41] to drop us some feedback as we aim to utilize these conversations to contribute to the investment
[00:50:46] communities understanding of risk your input is valuable and provides direction on where we should
[00:50:52] focus please email us at feedback at alpha exchangepodcast.com thanks again and catch you next time